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Silberg v. California Life Insurance
Company: A New Dimension In The
Tort Of Insurer Bad Faith?
The past eight years have seen the birth and development of an explosive new tort in California law involving insurance companies that
fail to deal fairly and in good faith with their insureds. Since this "bad
faith tort" was first announced in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.1 it
has been applied to two types of insurance claims situations: Crisci
applied it to liability insurers that fail to settle third-party claims
against their policyholders; in 1973 the California Supreme Court, in
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,2 extended bad faith tort liability
to insurers that refuse to pay the direct claims of their insureds. The
expansive character of this tort was underscored in the more recent
case of Silberg v. CaliforniaLife Insurance Co.,3 which held a health
care insurer liable largely for its bad faith failure to honor a promise
contained in the policy application. This aspect of the Silberg decision
seems to foreshadow an entirely new dimension of the bad faith tort.
In addition, the decision raised several new issues concerning insurer
liability, but provided few practical criteria to define what appears to
be a more expansive concept of liability. In light of these developments, this comment sets forth possible rationales supporting Silberg's
expanded concept of insurer bad faith and pursues an analysis of statutory and judicial criteria which the courts may apply in clarifying
and qualifying insurer liability in the context of direct claims of
insureds.
THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF INSURER

BAD FAITH TORT LIABILITY

A.

Bad Faith in the Context of Third-PartyClaims

The Crisci case, which first established insurer tort liability for bad
faith, was preceded by a wealth of decisions which grappled with the
contractual liability of insurers for bad faith failure to settle claims
1. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).

2. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
3. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
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against their insureds.4 Many of the principles which evolved in these
earlier cases were borrowed by Crisci when tort liability was first im-

posed."

To understand Crisci, and to gain some perspective on its

counterpart in the area of direct claims of insureds ("first-party

claims"), a brief overview of the decisions dealing with contractual liability for third-party claims is necessary.
Beginning with Hilker v. Western Auto Insurance Co.," courts held

that liability insurers faced with claims against their insureds must act
in accordance with an obligation of good faith and fair dealing, im-

plied in every contract, when deciding whether to settle within the
policy limits. Insurers who breached this convenant by their bad faith
refusal to accept such settlements were held liable in contract for the
full amount of judgments against their insureds in excess of the policy
limits.7 To ascertain whether the insurer had acted in bad faith,

which, quipped one writer, was "somewhat like asking what constitutes sin,"" the California courts established the following guidelines:

(1) In considering a settlement offer, the insurer must act as though
there were no policy limits; 9 (2) the insurer must give at least as
much consideration to the interests of the insured as it does to its own

interests;10 (3) the insurer should keep the insured informed as to settlement negotiations;"' (4) the insurer should investigate the claim or
seek legal advice, and avoid seeking a settlement contribution from
the insured;' 2 and (5) the insurer should consider the strength of the
claimant's case against the insured. 13
4. E.g., Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1963); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957). See
also Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. R-v.
1136 (1954).
5. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429-30, 426 P.2d 173, 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967).
6. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
7. E.g., Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d
198, 200 (1958); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 793-94, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 403-04 (1964); Martin v. Hartford Ace. & 1fndem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178,
182, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (1964); Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 8,
231 N.W. 257, 260 (1930).
8. Wymore, Safeguarding Against Claims in Excess of Policy Limits, 28 INs.
CouNsEL J. 44, 44 (1961).
9. Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 900, 42 Cal. Rptr.
394, 398 (1965); Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 659, 320 P.2d
140, 146 (1958).
10. Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198,
201 (1958); Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 148, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414-15
(1968); Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 660, 320 P.2d 140, 146
(1958).
11. Kinder v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 901, 42 Cal. Rptr.
394, 398 (1965); cf. Palmer v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 204 (1963).
12. Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 319 P.2d 69, 75
(1957).
13. See id.
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Perhaps the overriding factor behind this development of bad faith
liability is the special character courts attribute to the insurance contract, under which insurers are held to broader legal responsibilities
than are parties to purely private contracts. 14 In this respect, the California Supreme Court went so far as to emphasize in Communale v.
Traders & General Insurance Co.' that even if the express terms of
the policy do not require settlement, the implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing imposes a duty on the insurer to settle in appropriate cases. While the Communale court ostensibly permitted the insured to recover judgment against the insurer in contract, the court
suggested that bad faith failure to settle might be treated as a breach
of contract or as a tort.' 6
In the landmark case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,17 the California Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Communale and for
the first time imposed tort liability on an insurer for its bad faith refusal to settle a third-party claim against its insured. The court declared that liability was imposed "not for a bad faith breach of the
contract but for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements, a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."' 8 In determining the existence of insurer bad faith the
court considered whether "a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the settlement offer."' 9 The significance of the
independent remedy in tort was that it allowed recovery by the insured of punitive damages and damages for emotional distress which
otherwise would have been barred in contract.2 0 The court emphasized that the newly conceived bad faith tort was designed to protect
the insured's interest in peace of mind and security under a policy of
2
liability insurance. 1
B.

Bad Faith in the Handlingof Direct Claims of the Insured
Soon after Crisci was decided, the California Supreme Court, in
Reichert v. General Insurance Co.,22 refused to extend an insurer's liability for bad faith to a case in which a direct claim of the insured
was arbitrarily denied. The Reichert decision, together with the special agency relationship said to exist between a liability insurer and its
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 580, 34 P.2d 731, 732 (1934).
50 Cal. 2d 654, 659, 328 P.2d 198, 201 (1958).
Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (emphasis added).
Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
See id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
Id.
68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968).
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insured when the insurer deals with third-party claimants,2 3 may have
fostered an assumption that Crisci's tort principles would be limited to
the context of third-party claims. Nevertheless, three years after Crisci
was decided, a California court of appeal announced in Fletcher v.
Western National Life Insurance Co.2 4 that the principles applied in
Crisci should be extended to insurers handling the direct claims of
their insureds. While the court in Fletcher held that the defendant was
liable on grounds of intentional infliction of emotional distress, it also
proceeded to an "alternate holding." 25 The court explained that a
new tort action, allowing recovery of economic losses for breach of
contract and damages for emotional distress, could be maintained
against the insurer for its bad faith withholding of disability benefits. 20 This new tort action, the court explained, "square[d] with the
economic, social and legal realities of the problem presented," in that
it allowed recovery for all proximately caused detriment in a single
cause of action, comported with the quasi-public nature of the insurance industry, and guarded the peculiarly vulnerable insured against
the oppressive tactics of the economically powerful insurance industry.27 The standard for this bad faith tort liability was framed in terms
of the vexatious tactics which gave rise to the emotional distress action. Thus, an insurer would be held liable when payments were withheld "maliciously and without probable cause, for the purpose of in28
juring its insured by depriving him of the benefits of the policy.
A second California appellate court decision, Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,2 9 purported to adopt the principles embodied in Crisci and Fletcherin imposing tort liability on an automobile
insurer who handled an uninsured motorist claim in the following
manner:
[1] Employers [the insurer] deliberately, willfully and in bad faith
withheld payment of the Richardson claim months after it knew the
claim to be completely valid; [2] it forced an arbitration hearing on
a claim against which it already knew that it had no defense; [3]
even after the award was made it instructed its local office to attempt "to make the best possible settlement," and [4] forced plaintiffs to resort to litigation to have the award judicially confirmed 3 0
23. Comment, Contracting for Punitive Damages: Fletcher v. Western National
Life Insurance Company, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 208, 224 (1971).

24. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
25. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
26. Id.

27. Id. at 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
28. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (emphasis added).
29. 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972).

30. Id. at 239, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 552 (emphasis added).
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The court characterized this conduct as a "tortious breach of contract" insofar as the insurer had breached its implied-in-law duty of
good faith and fair dealing in handling the insured's claim.31 Richardson thus became the first California case to base tort recovery by a
first-party claimant solely on the bad faith rationale.
Finally, in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 2 the California Supreme Court voiced its approval of the theory of tortious liability espoused in Fletcher and Richardson and attempted to clarify the principles upon which it was based. The court emphasized that tort
liability for failure to settle third-party claims or pay first-party claims
follows from the breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing common to both types of insurance claims.38 In the context of
the first-party claim, this implied duty imposes on an insurer the obligation not to withhold policy payments without proper cause34 or unreasonably and in bad faith.3 5 Pursuant to these standards, the plaintiffs allegations in Gruenberg that the insurer had "wilfully and
maliciously entered into a scheme to deprive him [the insured] of the
benefits of the fire policies," though not a model pleading, stated a
cause of action for bad faith. 6 Under these same standards, damages
for proximately caused mental distress were held to be recoverable regardless of whether the distress was "severe.13 7 Gruenberg thus affirmed the fact that insurer bad faith presents a cause of action in tort
distinct from an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 8
Even after the decisions in Fletcher, Richardson, and Gruenberg,
some uncertainty remained as to the type of conduct by an insurer
which would give rise to bad faith tort liability in the first-party context. 9 The rather vague test enunciated in Gruenberg provided little
guidance. Two commentators, after synthesizing the language and
theory of the three decisions, suggested that a form of willful misconduct was required in order to state a cause of action based upon bad
31. Id.
32. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
33. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
34. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
35. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Two commentators have
suggested that the allegation of "severe" emotional distress should be retained as an element in the bad faith action since actions for both negligent and intentional infliction
of emotional distress retain such a requirement. Parks & Hell, Insurers Beware: "Bad
Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63, 71 (1973). Gruenberg disapproved Richardson
insofar as it expressed a different view on this point. 9 Cal. 3d at 580 n.10, 510 P.2d
at 1042 n.10, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490 n.10.
38. 9 Cal. 3d at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
39. See Comment, An Independent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts-Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co., 11 SAN DMo L. lIv. 492, 503
(1974).

594
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faith. 40 Indeed, the facts proven in both Fletcher 1 and Richardson,4 2

and those alleged in the Gruenberg43 complaint, depict insurers who
actively engaged in maneuvers to avoid making payment on policies
under which liability was clear. In this respect, the factual setting in
Silberg v.

California Life Insurance Co.44 presents

a striking

contrast.
SILBERG V. CALIFORNIA LIFE INSURANCE Co.

The facts in Silberg constitute a classic illustration of the disastrous
consequences which may befall an insured following a disability insurer's decision to withhold payments under the policy. The plaintiff,
Silberg, had taken out a hospital care policy with the defendant, California Life, which provided for the payment of hospital costs of up to
$5,000 in the event of injury or sickness, but excluded any loss caused
by an injury covered by workers' compensation. On July 17, 1966,
Silberg seriously injured his right foot while performing incidental
services in his landlord's laundromat. He was hospitalized the same
day and underwent surgery. Although notice of the injury and claim
forms were immediately forwarded to the insurer, it failed to respond
until the following November, at which time Silberg was informed
that all payments would be withheld pending resolution of his workers' compensation claim.45 As this claim was not settled until April
1968, Silberg was without any compensation for his medical expenses
for almost two years. 46 Meanwhile, in order to secure necessary treatment without the insurance benefits, Silberg visited two other hospitals. In one case he was denied admission until he paid $500 of his
prior bill, and in another case he had to resort to deception to obtain
surgery. As Silberg's hospital costs mounted, so did his personal misfortunes. His unpaid medical bills established him as a credit risk,
barring him from securing any business loans. As a result, he lost his
dry cleaning business and suffered five evictions for failure to meet his
monthly rent. His wheelchair was repossessed, and he was often un40. Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FoRum 63,
67 (1973). These authors suggested that the elements of a cause of action based on
bad faith exist when (1) the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying the claim of
the insured and (2) with knowledge or in reckless disregard of this fact, the insurer denied the insured his policy benefits. Id. at 67-68.
41. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 386-94, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83-88.
42. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 237-39, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 550-52.
43. 9 Cal. 3d at 569-72, 510 P.2d at 1034-35, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482-83.
44. 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
45. This decision followed defendant's discovery that the workers' compensation
carrier had denied coverage and that the matter would not be heard on appeal for several
months. Id. at 458, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
46. Silberg's medical expenses were $6,900, and the workers' compensation carrier
settled for $3,700. Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1105, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
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able to afford medication to ease his constant pain. Silberg utlimately
suffered two nervous breakdowns provoked by his concern over the
unpaid medical bills.47
In April 1968, the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board resolved Silberg's claim through compromise and release. This action
was taken due to conflicting evidence as to whether the injury occurred in the course of employment.48 Consequently, no formal findings of coverage were ever made. The insurer interpreted this compromise as constituting payment under workers' compensation law and for
this reason denied all liability under the policy. 4
Following the insurer's denial of liability, Silberg initiated suit on
the policy. His first cause of action, seeking a declaratory judgment as
to coverage under the policy, resulted in a jury finding that the policy
was ambiguous"0 and hence obligated the insurer to pay the full
amount provided in the insurance contract. Plaintiff's second cause of
action sought recovery for economic losses and physical and mental
suffering, and alleged that the defendant was guilty of fraud, bad
faith, and malicious and oppressive conduct."1 On this count the jury
awarded Silberg $75,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive damages. Following judgment on the verdict, however, the trial judge, on
defendant's motion, ordered a new trial on the basis that the evidence
52
was insufficient to support a finding of bad faith.
The plaintiff appealed the award of a new trial to the California Supreme Court. When faced with this unique set of facts, the court ruled
that as a matter of law the insurer had breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing and was liable in tort for the physical and mental suf47. Id. at 456-59, 521 P.2d at 1106-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714-16.
48. Id. at 458, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
49. Id.
50. A conflict between the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause in the policy
gave rise to two reasonable interpretations of the policy: (1) that the insurer was not
liable at all if the insured received any benefits, or (2) that the insurer was still liable
for any hospital expenses not covered by workers' compensation. Applying the timehonored rule of construction which favors the insured in cases in which the interpretation of an insurance policy is in doubt, the court chose the latter alternative. Id. at
463-64, 521 P.2d at 110-11, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
51. Id. at 456, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
52. The evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. . . .
There was no evidence that at the time the policy was issued the defendant
knew or should have known how a court would rule on this set of facts or that
they made any misrepresentation to him on which he relied. In researching
the case neither counsel nor the Court found any case specifically on point that
they would have been on notice of at the time of the issuance of the policy.
Similarly there was insufficient evidence of any custom or usage in the industry at that time to justify any such finding or to impose any duty on the
defendant to pay the proceeds of its policy and then assert a lien claim.
Id. at 460 n.3, 521 P.2d at 1108 n.3, 113, Cal. Rptr. at 716 n.3 (citing the order of the
trial judge in granting a new trial).
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fering occasioned the insured.5 3 In spite of the fact that neither customary insurance practice nor the policy imposed a clear duty on the
insurer to make payment while the workers' compensation award was
unresolved, 54 the court found that delaying payment in these circumstances was "unreasonable and in bad faith" under Gruenberg.55 The
court's finding of bad faith was based largely on its determination that
the insurer, in delaying payment of the claim, had failed to vindicate
an express promise contained in the policy application.58 That "promise" read, "Protect Yourself Against the Medical Bills That Can Ruin
You." In the court's view, the insurer had warranted against the very
ruination which its delay wreaked upon the insured. 57 As a "reasonable" alternative to delaying payment and facing potential liability, the
court suggested that the insurer could have promptly paid the medical
charges and later recouped the excess payments by asserting a lien on
any forthcoming workers' compensation award. 8
POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR A NEW
IN TORT LIABILITY

DIMENSION

If, as has been suggested, the existence of insurer bad faith is to be
ascertained by analyzing the "totality of the circumstances" when a
claim is made on the policy,5 then it might be said that an insurer's
failure to vindicate a precontractual promise or pledge is simply an-

other element to consider in evaluating the insurer's conduct. Language in the Silberg opinion suggests, however, that the court es-

chewed such an approach and instead characterized the insurer's
53. Id. at 460, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The case was remanded
for retrial on the issue of punitive damages since the supreme court refused to equate
bad faith conduct, as a matter of law, with the intent to injure requisite to an award
of punitive damages. Id. at 463, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718. One commentator views the Silberg decision as the forerunner to a more restrictive approach to
punitive damages. Levit, California Supreme Court Holds Insurer Guilty of Bad Faith
But Denies Punitive Damages, 1974 INS. L.J. 321, 326.
54. 11 Cal. 3d at 460 n.3, 521 P.2d at 1108 n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716 n.3. The
court refused to allow the insurer to defend on the basis that his conduct in withholding
payment on the policy was not contrary to established practice in the industry. Id. at
462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
55. Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. An insurer might understandably be reluctant to make immediate payment
under a policy similar to Silberg's where there is more certainty as to the insured's entitlement to workers' compensation, since in such cases entitlement to a lien claim on the
workers' compensation award would be doubtful. See Foremost Dairies v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 237 Cal. App. 2d 560, 579, 47 Cal. Rptr. 173, 186 (1965).
59. Comment, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v.
v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HAsT. LJ. 699, 712 (1974). A recent third-party bad faith
case declares it to be axiomatic that the issue of an insurer's bad faith is a jury question.
Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n, etc., Bureau, 41 Cal. App. 3d 974, 983, 116
Cal. Rptr. 546, 551 (1974).
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failure to vindicate its precontractual promise as patent bad faith. 0° In
any case, the Silberg court's emphasis on the promissory aspect of the
insurer's conduct raises the possibility of a drastic expansion of insurer tort liability beyond the immediate contractual boundaries of the
insurer-insured relationship. The extent of such an expansion, and the
precise effect which precontractual promises may have on the insurer's standard of conduct, may depend upon the theoretical justification
the courts articulate as the basis for this new dimension of bad faith liability (herein denominated "promissory bad faith"). Two potential
justifications are examined below.
A.

Wetherbee Fraud

An insurer's breach of its precontractual promise, determined in
Silberg to be actionable, could be characterized as a form of fraud.
An instructive parallel to Silberg in this respect is Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America,6 ' decided by a California court of appeal soon after Crisci but before Fletcher. Wetherbee arose as a fraud
action brought by an insured against her insurer. Assurances by the
insurer that its policy awarded lifetime benefits for sickness or injury
and could not be terminated in cases of disability induced plaintiff to
renew her policy with the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff suffered a stroke, and monthly payments were made under the disability
provision of the policy, though the checks were often late. Over a year
later, however, following carefully worded inquiries made to the insured's doctor, the insurer stopped all payments on the ground that
because plaintiff went regularly to the doctor's office for treatment,
her disability was not "confining" within the general coverage of the
policy. This action was taken in spite of a provision in the policy
which expressly permitted recovery in cases where, as here, the insured visited a doctor for treatment which could not be administered
62
in the home.
In affirming a verdict of fraud the Wetherbee court declared that
the character of the fraud was not so much a misrepresentation of the
60. 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 1106-07, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. The following
facts in Silberg might have been used by the court to support its finding of bad faith:
(1) The insurer failed to contact Silberg for several months after the claim was first
made, and after several hospital bills had accrued; (2) the insurer made a collateral investigation to determine if the insured had made any misrepresentations as to his health
on the policy application (to support a rescission of the contract); and (3) an offer to
settle Silberg's claim for $200 was made by the insurer once the workers' compensation
claim was settled by compromise and release. Id. at 457-58, 521 P.2d at 706-07, 113
Cal. Rptr. at 714-15.
61. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
62. Id. at 925-27, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766-67.
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terms of the policy as it was a misrepresentation of the willingness of
the insurer to live up to those terms.63 The insurer's conduct following
the insured's submission of her claim was viewed as indicative of an
earlier intent to defraud:
[lit is obvious that the defendant's eagerness to seize upon the admission by plaintiff's doctor as a ground for cancellation of plaintiff's benefits furnishes ample support for a -finding that it never
intended to fulfill either . . . [its prior] representations . . . or

-the terms of the [policy]. 64
By inferring precontractual intent to defraud from post-contractual
conduct, the Wetherbee court greatly reduced the difficulty which the
insured would otherwise have confronted in attempting to prove
fraud. With the development of the first-party bad faith action, the
necessity for employing such a rationale may be questioned, but the
reasoning still appears to be sound. In fact, the opinion was reaffirmed following the Fletcher decision, when the case came up on appeal from a retrial on the issue of punitive damages. 5 The second
Wetherbee opinion provided further support for the earlier decision
by declaring that a fraud recovery of this sort serves to protect the unwary consumer from unscrupulous insurance salesmen where the bargaining power of the parties is considerably disparate. 66
It may be argued that Wetherbee fraud and promissory bad faith
are but opposite sides of the same coin. In both instances the propriety
of the later claims-handling conduct of the insurer is viewed with reference to the policy and precontractual representations. Since fraud
has been found to be indicative of bad faith, 67 conduct by an insurer
which would support a Wetherbee fraud action might also give rise to
an action for promissory bad faith.
Examining the facts in Silberg in this light, it could be said that the
insurer misrepresented its "willingness" to fulfill its precontractual
promise and was thus guilty of a form of fraud under the Wetherbee
rationale. The insurer promised to pay medical benefits to Silberg to
protect him from "ruination." 68 However, the insurer later took the
position that it was entitled to delay payment on the policy until work63. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770.

64. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770-71.
65. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 95 Cal. Rptr.
678 (1971).
66. Id. at 271, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
67. "Bad faith implies dishonesty, fraud and concealment." Davy v. Public Nat'l
Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 396, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492-93 (1960); accord, Palmer
v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 429, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 (1963).
68. 11 Cal. 3d at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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ers' compensation proceedings were concluded. 60 This stance was
maintained in spite of the fact that the medical bills incurred by the
insured were in fact causing his ultimate ruination.70 By Wetherbee
standards this course of conduct might indicate that the insurer never
intended to fulfill its promise contained in the policy application and
thus a Wetherbee fraud action would lie.
Arguably, had the Silberg court's finding of bad faith been equiva-

lent to a finding of fraud as a matter of law, then punitive damages
should have been allowed. 7 ' The court, however, refused to hold that

punitive damages were available as a matter of law.72 One explanation for this result is that the court viewed the conduct of the insurer
as fraudulent for the purposes of proving a case of bad faith, but insufficiently aggravated in character to establish the right to punitive
damages. Another explanation is that the court effected a trade-off:
in allowing the insured an inference of precontractual intent to defraud from such a showing of post-contractual conduct under Wetherbee, the court concomitantly denied the insured the right to punitive
damages. Admittedly these explanations, if correct, would constitute
a new approach to fraud and punitive damages. 73
B.

Fulfilling the ReasonableExpectations of the Insured

As an alternative to its characterization as a form of fraud, promissory bad faith might be explained as an expansion of the judicial doctrine which holds an insurer accountable for the reasonable expecta-

tions of its insured.74 Courts have long viewed the insurance industry
as quasi-public in character 5 and have treated the insurance contract
as one of adhesion.76 In actions sounding in contract, courts have
69. Id. at 458, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
70. Silberg had no other hospital insurance, earned only a modest income, and was
incurring large medical bills without the immediate benefit of workers' compensation.
Id. at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
71. See Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 484, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 871, 875-76 (1969).
72. 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718. See note 53 supra.
73. Fraud alone is a sufficient basis for punitive damages. E.g., Horn v. Guaranty
Chevrolet Motors, 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 484, 75 Cal. Rptr. 871, 875-76 (1969); cf.
Levitt, CaliforniaSupreme Court Holds Insurer Guilty of Bad Faith But Denies Punitive
Damages, 1974 INs. U. 321, 326.
74. See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456
P.2d 674, 682, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114 (1969).
75. E.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668 n.5, 456
P.2d 674, 680 n.5, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 n.5 (1969); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.
2d 263, 270, 419 P.2d 168, 172, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1966); Bekin v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 138, 293 N.W. 200, 210 (1940).
76. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456 P.2d 674,
682, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114 (1969); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-70,
419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966); Terzian v. California Cas.
Indem. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 942, 950, 117 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1974). It seems

600

1975 / Insurer Bad Faith
therefore looked beyond the form of the contract, even to precontractual dealings, in determining the reasonable expectations of the insured. 77 The adhesion-contract, public-trust rationale is emphasized
in Fletcher78 and Richardson79 and in a lengthy dissent in Gruenberg. 0 Furthermore, this rationale was utilized in the second

Wetherbee opinion in support of the court's apparent expansion of the
traditional fraud action. 8 '
If the precontractual representation of the insurer in Silberg could

be said to have raised the reasonable expectation of the insured that
he would be paid in these particular circumstances, then the insurer
would be bound to take this expectation into account in acting on a
policy claim, 8s since the insurer's duty to deal fairly and in good faith
would concomitantly rise with the reasonable expectations of the in-

sured. Under this approach, the insurer could be held liable for promissory bad faith, even in cases in which liability was doubtful within
the four comers of the policy,8 3 unless strong justification could be

shown by the insurer.

84

It seems that the reasonable expectations theory would be more en-

compassing than Wetherbee fraud; the reasonable expectations theory
unlikely that the bad faith tort will be extended to other contracts outside the quasipublic field of insurance. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); Comment, An Independent Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts-Gruenbergv. Aetna Insurance Co., 11
SAN DiEGo L. REv. 492, 502 (1974).
77. See, e.g., Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 669, 456
P.2d 674, 682, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 114 (1969); accord, Terzian v. California Cas. Indem.
Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 942, 950, 117 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1974). "In short, the insurance company may not ignore its insured and then seek refuge in the fine print of its
policy." Id.
78. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); accord, Eckenrode
v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972).
79. An insurance policy is a contract of adhesion; and, therefore, the reasonable expectations of the weaker party, the insured, must be taken into account.
A reasonable expectation of the insured under such protection is that his
clam will be handled by the insurer promptly, fairly, and in good faith.
25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 244, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 555-56 (1972).
80. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 582-83, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 491 (1973)
(Roth. J., dissenting).
81. 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 271, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 681 (1971). See text accompanying note 66 supra.
82. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109,
113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. Silberg failed to consider that there might be problems involved
in introducing extrinsic evidence of precontractual representations if the insurance policy
were considered to be an integrated contract. A. CorniN, CONTRACTS §573 (1962). In
the context of a tort action for insurer bad faith, however, even though a contractual
relation must first exist, it seems particularly inappropriate to consider the parol evidence rule as a bar to the introduction of evidence of precontractual representations.
83. This would also seem to be true if promissory bad faith were to be rationalized
in terms of Wetherbee fraud. Both rationales expand the judicial scrutiny of an insurers
conduct beyond the four corners of the policy.
84. Silberg intimates that in some cases justification might exist for an insurer's
failure to vindicate a precontractual promise. 11 Cal. 3d at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113
Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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could take into account representations made beyond the immediate
realm of negotiations with a potential insured, since many representations made outside this context could be said to foster reasonable expectations on the part of a prospective insured as to the performance
of a particular insurer under particular types of policies.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF SILBERG

A.

Parametersfor Promissory Bad Faith

Whether promissory bad faith is characterized as a form of fraud or
as a failure of the insurer to account for the reasonable expectations of
the insured, this new dimension to the bad faith tort requires clarification in two broad aspects. First, Silberg lends scant guidance as to the
kinds of promises or representations that will expose an insurer to liability on a promissory bad faith basis. Secondly, there is uncertainty as
to the context in which a precontractual promise must be made and
the relation it must bear to the underlying insurance policy in order
for promissory bad faith liability to arise. This uncertainty is troublesome for the insurer who has advertised its services with a slogan such
as "You Can Count On Us." Such a slogan may be sufficiently removed
from the Silberg situation to insulate the insurer from liability, but Silberg's lack of useful criteria for distinguishing between liability and
non-liability-producing precontractual promises makes this determination difficult and potentially hazardous for the insurer.
The court in Silberg treated the exhortation to "Protect Yourself
Against Medical Bills That Can Ruin You" as equivalent to a promise
to pay the insured if he were threatened with financial ruin. 5 The
translation of those words into a specific obligation seems to require
something of a quantum leap, and a more general representation,
such as "You Can Count On Us," might not be translatable into an
additional obligation of the insurer. In addition, it would appear that
the relationship which the above advertising slogan would bear to later issuance of a policy would be more tenuous than that involved in
Silberg, in which the precontractual representation appeared in the insurance application itself. Such distinctions might insulate an insurer
who had made only generally-worded representations to an insurance
applicant.
Finally, if a precontractual representation is of such a nature and is
made in such a context as to charge the insurer with a specific obligation, it becomes important to ask if this obligation effectively changes
85. Id.
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the coverage under the policy. If policy coverage is unclear, Silberg
seems to imply that the precontractual representation does in fact
override the policy and mandate coverage."' If, however, the policy's
provisions clearly exclude coverage, it is doubtful that a precontractual
representation would override the policy. This follows from the fact
that it would be questionable whether reasonable expectations of coverage could be maintained in the face of express policy provisions
which clearly excluded coverage in a particular situation. Until criteria for resolving these problems are forthcoming, however, insurers
may find it necessary to re-examine the tenor of their advertising representations and consider the need for including disclaimers in policy
applications.
B.

The Effect of Industry Custom
Independent of any consideration of promissory bad faith, another
aspect of Silberg which needs further clarification is the effect of industry custom on the standard of conduct to which insurers are held.
The weight which a court could assign to industry custom in determining liability was left open when the Silberg court indicated only
that an insurer's duty could not be prescribed entirely by customs in
the industry.8 7 By implication, an insurer's adherence to industry custom might be considered as some evidence of good faith and fair dealing." While courts would be reluctant to allow the insurance industry
to dictate the standards for determining insurer good faith, it would
appear that evidence of industry-wide, standardized claims-handling
procedures should nevertheless carry some weight in determining liability. 9 Conversely, the failure of an insurer to follow recommended
company claims-handling procedures may not in itself be conclusive
of liability, but could be some evidence of bad faith.90
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS
ON Tno BAD FAITH TORT

A.

Legislative Criteria
Practical legislative criteria which might be employed by the courts

86. Id.
87. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
88. One article points out the practical difficulty an insurer would have in trying
to convince a jury of the reasonableness of its decision as to the insured's claim when
no standardized industry-wide procedures exist against which the reasonableness of the
insurer's conduct can be measured. Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" is in
Full Bloom, 9 FoRUa 63, 68 (1973).
89. See id.
90. Cf. W. PRossER, HANDooK OF Trm LAw oF TORTS 168 (4th ed. 1971) (the
effect of custom on the standard of care in negligence).
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in first-party bad faith actions are embodied in "unfair claims settlement' provisions recently enacted in California 91 and a handful of
other states. 92 These statutes enumerate claims-handling procedures,

delineated in the margin, 93 which, if regularly employed, will subject
the insurer to the suspension or loss of its license to do business in the
state.9" To the extent that the California statute imposes a duty on in-

surers to avoid such unfair practices, violation of the statute may be
taken as bad faith per se.95 While the list of unfair practices is by no
means comprehensive,96 and perhaps no list could conceive of all imINS. CODE §790.03(h), as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 725, §1, at 1314.
92. KAN. SrAT. ANN. §40-2404(9) (1973); ORE. REV. STAT. §746.230 (1974);
TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.21-2 (Supp. 1974).
93. The California staute proscribes the following procedures:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions
relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications
with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under
an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made
claims for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to
which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to
written or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries,
upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the
amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and
then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both
of which submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent,
under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied
on in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the
denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (emphasis added); accord, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(9)
(1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 746.230 (1974); Tnx. INS. CODE art. 21.21-2 (Supp. 1974).
94. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.07.
95. See Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assur. So'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 1001, 110
Cal. Rptr. 470, 475 (1973); accord, Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406,
410, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (1975); cf. W. PROSSmE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
196 (4th ed. 1971) (violation of statute in negligence cases).
96. A proposed amendment to California's "unfair claims settlement" statute would
add the following two unfair practices: (1) directly advising the insured not to retain

91. CAL.
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proper claims-settlement practices, the California statute could nevertheless serve as a practical yardstick in many bad faith cases arising in
the first-party context.
Just as the unfair claims-handling provisions of the Insurance Code
may provide partial criteria for determining what types of conduct by
an insurer will constitute a breach of its implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing, specific regulations of the California Insurance
Commission' governing disability insurance advertising could furnish guidelines as to the kinds of precontractual representations that
may affect an insurer's post-contractual obligations. The purpose of
these regulations is to establish minimum standards governing insurance advertising in order to ensure accurate and truthful descriptions
of insurance policies.9" While these regulations are expressly limited
to disability insurers" and are designed to give the state the power to
police infractions, 10 0 they appear broad enough to be of general application and could be construed to vest a private right of action in insurance consumers injured by the deceptive practices. 101 These regulations proscribe the use in disability insurance advertising of words and
phrases which may mislead prospective purchasers as to policy benefits payable or types of losses covered, or which may exaggerate any
benefits beyond the terms of the policy.' 0 2 The fact that the insurer allows the purchaser to inspect the policy before the ultimate sale does
not excuse the use of these misleading statements. 0 3 Moreover, the
regulations require a disability insurer to affirmatively disclose policy
limitations and coverage exceptions when describing any policy benefits.' 04 These regulations could serve as viable criteria for insurer liability in the area of promissory bad faith in that they specify precontractual representations that fall below minimum standards of acceptability.
Specific legislation aimed at the problems raised in a Silberg factual
setting would clarify the duties of the insurer and perhaps reduce future litigation in the area of insurer bad faith. A measure of this type,
an attorney and (2) misleading the insured as to the applicable statute of limitations.
A.B. 92, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, January 21, 1975.
97. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE art. 12 (commencing with §2535).
98. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §2535.1.
99. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §2535.2.

100. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §2537. Violation of these regulations may ultimately
result in the suspension or loss of the insurer's license to do business in the state. CAL.
INS. CODE §790.07.
101. See Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 34 Cal. App.3d 994, 1001, 110
Cal. Rptr. 470, 475 (1973).
102. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §2536.2(a).
103. Id.
104. 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §2536.2(b).
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Senate Bill 1357,105 was introduced in the 1973-74 session of the California Legislature and failed passage in the assembly,10 6 but similar
legislation could be considered. Basically, Senate Bill 1357 would
have imposed a duty upon companies insuring employees under disability or health care policies to furnish benefits in cases in which
workers' compensation is pending, regardless of any language to the
contrary in the insurance policy. 1 7 In addition, Senate Bill 1357
would have eliminated any bar to a disability insurer's assertion of lien
rights in the proceeds of an insured's workers' compensation award.108
By imposing an absolute obligation on an insurer to pay claims
of its insureds in these cases, regardless of whether a precontractual promise such as in Silberg was involved, such legislation would
render moot in some situations the question of the extent to which the
existense of a precontractual promise creates a higher standard of conduct for an insurer.
If the paucity of guidelines for determining bad faith liability in the
first-party context is due to the relatively recent recognition of the
tort, then it may be helpful to examine judicial construction of "bad
faith" statutes which have been in effect in other states for many
years. 10 9 A typical example of such statutes is one enacted in Missouri
in 1865, 11 which provides in effect that an insurer who "vexatiously"
refuses to pay losses on certain policies is liable for a penalty of up to
ten percent of the insured's actual losses and reasonable attorney's
fees. The purpose of such a statute is twofold: (1) to shift to a recalcitrant insurer the expense of securing payment of loss"' and (2) to correct the evil of arbitrary refusals to pay claims." 2 The statutory penalty has been imposed in cases where an insurer has withheld payment
13
without reasonable cause or excuse, or in bad faith.1
105. 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, April 22, 1974.
106. WEEKLY HISTORY OF THE CALIrORNA SENATE 220 (Oct. 4, 1974).
107. S.B. 1357, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended, April 22, 1974, §§l-3.
108. Id. §4. In furnishing immediate benefits to an injured employee, an insurer
runs the risk of losing its right to compensation from an employer who successfully asserts the defense of lack of notice of need for medical treatment. Gerson v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d 735, 738, 11 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1961).
109. Amx. STAT. ANN. §66-3238 (1966); LA. REV. STAT. §22:657 (Supp. 1975); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §375.420 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. §44-359 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §561105 (1968). See generally R. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw 457-58 (1971)
(statutory penalties for nonpayment or late payment of insurance claims); 44 AM. JuR.
2d, Insurance §§1798, 1799 (1969) (statutory damages for insurer's refusal to pay claim,
or for delay in payment of claim).
110. Mo. ANN. STAr. §375.420 (1968).
111. Willis v. American Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 287 S.W.2d 98, 108 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956).
112. Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo. Ct. App.

1944).

113. E.g., Dixon v. Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 365 Mo. 580, 285
S.W.2d 619 (1955).
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The major limitation on insurer liability developed by judicial construction of such statutes is that an insurer is justified in withholding
payment on a doubtful claim by an insured, provided that the insurer
is not being recalcitrant or employing delaying tactics.' A "doubtful
claim" is one in which there is an open question of law or fact as to liability, 115 or in which a prudent man in good faith would believe
there is no liability." 6 To warrant refusal of a claim, the insurer must
at the time of the refusal have facts which would justify such an action. 1 7 In addition, the insurer must prove that refusal of the insured's claim was based on such facts and was not the arbitrary decision of a claims representative unqualified to appraise the significance
of these facts." 8 As a clarification of "statutory bad faith," the foregoing principles embodied in the case law of other jurisdictions may
prove useful in qualifying the developing common law of insurer bad
faith in California.
B.

JudicialCriteria
1.

Criteriafor the Handlingof Doubtful Claims

The preceding "statutory bad faith" cases suggest that insurer liability for bad faith should be limited in cases in which payment is
withheld because a claim is doubtful. A recent California case, Johansen v. California State Automobile Association, etc., Bureau," 9 supports such a limitation and provides several qualifying factors. While
Johansen involved bad faith tort liability in the context of a third-party claim, its applicability to first-party claims is indicated by the
court's reliance on Silberg. 2 9 In Johansen, the liability insurer rejected a policy-limits settlement offer, honestly believing that the policy
did not provide coverage under the circumstances. Subsequently, the
claimant recovered judgment against the insured in excess of the policy limits. The court rejected the insured's contention that the insurer
should be held strictly liable for the excess judgment and affirmed
bad faith as the only standard of liability.' 2 ' The court stated that
114. See Wiener v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 430,432 (E.D. Mo. 1945).
115. See, e.g., Kissel v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.W.2d 497, 509 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964).
116. See Union Indem. Co. v. Home Trust Co., 64 F.2d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1933).
117. Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Mo. Ct. App.
1969).
118. See Seguin v. Continental Serv. Life & Health Ins. Co., 230 La. 533, 89 So.
2d 113 (1956) (interpreting LA. Rav. STAT. §22:657 (1959) :which requires all claims
under health and accident policies to be paid within thirty days from the filing of a
claim unless there are "just and reasonable grounds" placing a "reasonable and prudent
businessman on his guard").
119. 41 Cal. App. 3d 974, 116 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1974).
120. See id. at 985, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
121. Id. at 979-82, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 549-51.
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"[n]o rules of law or equity have ever prescribed that the insurer
must pay under a policy which does not provide coverage for the incident in question."' 12 The court proceeded to note two facts which distinguished the case at bar from Silberg: first, there was no assurance
that the insurer would ever be able to recoup payment through a lien if
noncoverage was later confirmed; secondly, proceedings to determine
the existence of coverage were brought by the insurer. 2 3 Johansen, in
denying recovery to the insureds,12 4 thus suggested that liability for
bad faith will not be imposed on insurers withholding payment of
third-party or first-party claims if (1) liability under the policy is
doubtful, (2) payment of the disputed claim cannot be recouped
through a lien, and (3) declaratory relief is sought by the insurer. 2 5 It
is questionable, however, whether the Johansen criteria would apply
with equal force if the insurer, in withholding payment on a doubtful
claim, thereby fails to fulfill a precontractual promise, a factor which
Silberg treated as significant in determining insurer liability. 12 While
Johansen's analysis of Silberg failed to include a consideration of how
precontractual promises should affect the handling of doubtful
claims, several assumptions can be made in this regard. If the reasonable expectations of the insured, as fostered through an insurer's precontractual representations, effectively change the coverage of the
policy, 27 then to the extent that these representations may reasonably
be construed to obligate the insurer to make payment under the policy, the insured's claim would no longer be classified as "doubtful," irrespective of express provisions within the four comers of the policy.
If a doubtful claim loses its doubtful character in the presence of precontractual representations, then it would appear that the presence of
the other Johansen factors would not operate to excuse the insurer's
failure to pay. However, cases may arise in which claims are doubtful
because or in spite of precontractual representations. In these situations, the presence of the other Johansen factors may bar a finding of
bad faith.
122. Id. at 985, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 552 (emphasis added).
123. Id. In Silberg it was the insured who brought the dispute to court. 11 Cal.
3d at 456, 521 P.2d at 1106, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
124. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
125. See id. at 986, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Even if the Johansen criteria are met

it appears that if the insurer fails to keep the insured informed of the action being taken
on his claim, that the insurer may still be held liable for bad faith. Kinder v. Western

Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 894, 901, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (1965); cf. Palmer
v. Financial Indem. Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1963); accord,
Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 53 N.J. 313, 328, 250 A.2d 580, 588 (1969)
(when a disability insurer discontinues payments under the policy, its duty of good faith

requires it to inform the insured of the reasons for discontinuance and to explain to the

insured how he may enforce the claim).
126. See 11 Cal. 3d at 461, 521 P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717.

127. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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2.

Privilege

Johansen suggests that an insurer may be justified in certain cases
in withholding payment of a doubtful claim. A complementary consid-

eration which may also narrow the scope of insurer bad faith in the
first-party context is the concept of privilege. Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co. 2 8 recognized that an insurer conducting

settlement negotiations with its insured is privileged to assert its rights
in a "permissible way and with a good faith belief in the existence of

the rights asserted." The privilege was articulated by the court as a
limitation on liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'

29

However, such a broadly articulated privilege, rooted in the

strong public policy favoring the settlement of disputed claims,"'
may extend to the bad faith tort. In fact, in Mustachio v. Ohio Farm-

ers Insurance Co.,' 3 ' a California appellate court expressly recognized such a privilege in the context of a first-party bad faith tort ac-

tion. Mustachio indicated that an insurer who recognizes a claim but
honestly disagrees with the insured as to the amount to be paid in set-

tlement may be shielded from liability for bad faith if it bargains with
the insured to reach some accord.' 32 However, the scope of this privilege is exceeded if the insurer coerces acceptance of its first offer by
threatening to otherwise disregard the claim. 133 As a limitation on liability for bad faith, the concept of privilege overlaps with the considerations in Johansen regarding the handling of doubtful claims.
Fletcher and Mustachio thus suggest alternative courses of action for

an insurer which will shield it from liability for bad faith: (1) the insurer may bargain in good faith for settlement of a doubtful claim, or
(2) the insurer may withhold payment of a doubtful claim entirely
1 34
and seek declaratory relief.
128. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 395, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 89 (1970); accord, Eckenrode v.
Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972).
129. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
130. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602, 234 P.2d 16, 22
(1951); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 89 (1970); Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 800, 41 Cal. Rptr.
401, 408 (1964); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 696, 319 P.2d
69, 79 (1957).
131. 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 363-64, 118 Cal. Rptr. 581, 584 (1975).
132. Id. at 364, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
133. Id. at 363, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
134. The Crisci decision and the dissent to Gruenberg suggest a final limitation on
an insurer's liability for bad faith when they indicate that the contract for insurance imposes mutual obligations of good faith and fair dealing. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66
Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 583, 510 P.2d 1032, 1043, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 491 (1973)
(Roth, J., dissenting). The existence of this mutual obligation suggests that an insurer
who has reason to believe that an insured is prosecuting a claim fraudulently or in bad
faith would he warranted in withholding payment of the claim.
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3.

A Possible Synthesis of First-Party and Third-Party Criteria
for Bad Faith
The Johansen and Fletcher criteria for the handling of doubtful
claims and the privileged settlement of claims delineate general circumstances in which insurer bad faith will not lie, or in which payment can be withheld with "proper cause" under Gruenberg.'3 When
these standards are combined with those articulated in the area of
third-party claims, 1 6 there evolves an outline of criteria for an insurer's handling of an insured's claim: (1) when an insured first files a
claim, the insurer should conduct a bona fide investigation into the
facts surrounding the claim and seek legal advice as to any questionable issues of liability; 37 (2) given strong indications of fraud on the
part of the insured' 3 or of noncoverage under the law or facts, 1 and
absent an available lien right as in Silberg, the insurer may withhold
payment of the claim; (3) the insured should be kept fully apprised
of the handling of his claim and the reasons for any action on the
claim; 40 (4) the insurer should seek declaratory relief as to its liability under the policy when, under the law or the facts, coverage is in
question;' 41 (5) alternatively, if the claim is weak on its merits or the
amount of recovery is in question, then the insurer may bargain with
the insured to reach a settlement.' 42 The viability of these criteria in
shielding an insurer from liability for bad faith is questionable, however, when the insurer has made precontractual representations which
may reasonably be construed to mandate immediate payment of a
claim. Any action short of immediate payment may be a breach of
such a representation.- 3 Under another interpretation, however, if
the insured's claim is still doubtful in light of precontractual representations, the foregoing criteria are still valid considerations for an insurer seeking to shield itself from liability for bad faith. Whether the
precontractual representation may be contrued to create an obligation
overriding the express terms of the policy and exposing an insurer to
bad faith for its nonfulfullment could ultimately depend upon the
theory posited for holding insurers accountable for precontractual
representations.' 44
135. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 6-13 supra.
137. See Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 319 P.2d 69,
75 (1957); see text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
138. See note 134 supra.
139. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
140. See note 125 supra.
141. See text accompanying note 125 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 128-133 supra.
143. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 59-84 supra.
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CONCLUSION

In Silberg v. California Life Insurance Co., the California Supreme

Court appears to have added a new and as yet unqualified dimension
to the insurer bad faith tort in the form of "promissory bad faith,"
calling into question the nature and scope of the insurer's implied-inlaw duty of good faith and fair dealing. While it seems clear that a precontractual representation by an insurer will in some manner affect
the insurer's standard of conduct in handling an insured's claim, the
introduction of this new liability-producing factor requires both justification and a more careful delineation of the boundaries of the insurer
bad faith tort. The boundaries of an insurer's obligations in handling the
claims of its policyholders could be delineated in two ways: first,
through the application of statutory criteria *which suggest concrete
guidelines for bad faith or unfair dealing and examples of precontractual representations which might subject the insurer to bad faith liability; secondly, by the application of judicial standards regarding
privilege and the handling of doubtful claims which delineate instances
in which withholding payment of an insured's claim may be justified.
However the courts go about providing this clarification, the effort
should soon be initiated in order to remove the shrouds of uncertainty
surrounding the infant tort of insurer bad faith.
CraigC. Hunter

